蜜罐的经济学分析

Of course as an economist I am always wondering what the equilibrium is. And, in this case, what is the scarce factor? It seems that in the case under current consideration, the returns to honeypotting are very high for somebody. Maybe for China, maybe for the shorts, or maybe for parts of the Deep State that seek to shape domestic politics (and they possibly drove the timing of the leak?). So why are not three potential honeypots sent every day to the most prominent men? If the guy says no, you do not have to pay them for very long, right? Or you can just have them try another, different guy. I can think of a few hypotheses: 1. The number of attractive women with sufficient spy training is actually pretty low. Furthermore the spy agency has to trust the woman to some degree. 2. The number of attractive women willing to do this is pretty low. But at what wage? And in some countries threats to the family, or benefits to the family, can be added to the transaction. 3. It is difficult to access the most prominent men, and that limits the number of honeypots that can be sent. Furthermore, at some point the honeypot woman has to find time alone with the man, and that is not always easy. 4. In fact three potential honeypots are sent every day to the most prominent men. 5. Competition from the non-honeypot women is so strong the honeypots do not have such a great chance, thus limiting their supply. The non-honeypot temptresses will sometimes have stronger vetting as well. 6. Some of the most prominent men “go the Epstein route” instead, hoping for delegated vetting and a kind of mutual “hostage-taking,” noting that proved extremely risky as well. What else? The post The economics of honeypots appeared first on Marginal REVOLUTION.